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NATIONAL

The Challenge of
A Black Presidential
Candidacy (1984):
By Robert C. Smith and Joseph R McCormick, II

(Last of two parts)
he challenge of political
independence, in many
ways more difficult than
the challenge of ideology,
required that “[Jesse] Jackson be will
ing and able to carry his insurgency
into the general election as an inde
pendent candidate if the Democratic
Party yield [ed] to the pressure of its
right wing and repudiate [ed] its pro
gressive heritage and the liberal
agenda. ” 32 The basic impetus of this chal
lenge was to end the “captive” status of the
Black vote. In this regard, we quoted Pro
fessor Ronald Walters:

T

“The major candidates and the party ap
paratus have believed that the Black vote is
a captured vote, unable to mount credible
strategies of leverage, so the tendency in
creasingly has been to ignore both the im
portance of the vote and the policy interests
it represents. Therefore, in an effort to
maintain the credibility of the threat of
Blacks to retaliate if there is no bargaining,
the option has to remain open for Blacks to
threaten the Democratic Party with defeat
even in the general election by supporting
either a Black candidate or a third party
candidate. ” 33
We emphasized, however, that “an in
dependent challenge should be undertaken
only if the Democratic nominee and the
party’s platform reject a liberal and pro
gressive agenda. ”34
Since the Democratic Party did not, in
its nominees and platform, clearly re
pudiate the liberal ideology, there was not
a clear-cut basis for an independent Jackson challenge in the general election. In
addition, Jackson’s failure during the cam
paign to articulate a clear set of progres
sive alternatives further blunted the im
perative of an independent challenge. Cer
tainly there was no basis for such a chal
lenge on the issue of the second primary
and the related rules challenges set forth
by Jackson. Thus, the centrist Democratic
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nominee and platform, and Jackson’s fail
ure to articulate an alternative progressive
vision, rendered the challenge of political
independence moot.
Yet in a large survey of Black voters
conducted by the University of Michigan’s
National Black Election Study, 60% of the
respondents stated they would have voted
for Jackson if he had run as a third party
candidate.35 Additionally, 45% of the re
spondents felt that Blacks should form
their own political party, suggesting that
“blacks would switch their party allegiance
from the Democratic party if an alternative
was presented which they felt better ar
ticulated the interests of blacks.”36 These
data suggest that, in spite of the absence of
a clear ideological imperative for an inde
pendent challenge, Jackson nevertheless
might have received substantial support
among the masses of Blacks.
Jackson, early in the primary season,
publicly toyed with the idea of an inde
pendent candidacy,37 but he apparently
never gave it serious consideration, in
part, because he had pledged his “word of
honor” to his principal Black leadership
supporters that he would support the

Democratic nominee. Also, there was
concern that he lacked the necessary or
ganization and financing to mount an ef
fective national campaign, especially
given the complexity of obtaining ballot
positions in all 50 states.
The challenge of political independ
ence was therefore a failure — a fail
ure in the sense that the captive
status of the Black vote was not al
tered in 1984. The Republicans and
President Reagan, as usual, ig
nored the Black vote and the Dem
ocratic nominee, Walter Mondale,
took it for granted. President
Reagan made absolutely no at
tempt to appeal to the Black
community or its policy con
cerns and Mondale, after the convention,
ignored the policy concerns of Blacks and
instead relied on the Black community’s
fears of a second Reagan term (especially
with respect to Supreme Court appoint
ments) as the central theme of his appeal
to the Black electorate.
Mondale even ignored the minimalist
demands of Black leaders set forth at the
post-convention “Minnesota Summit”
which called for, among other things, high
level Black representation in his campaign,
control of party registration funds in the
Black community and a major policy
speech on South Africa.38 Indeed, Mon
dale did not campaign in the Black commu
nity until the final weeks of the election and
then sought largely to appeal to the com
munity’s hostility to Reagan rather than to
its legitimate policy interests.
These characteristics of the Democratic
campaign led some Blacks — notably
Ronald Walters — to call for a boycott of
the presidential ballot in the general elec
tion, and may have contributed to disaffec
tion with the Democratic ticket in the
Black community and a lower turn-out in
November than otherwise might have oc
curred.
1
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The Question of Political Independence

One final point: Although the challenge ethnicity, region, education, occupation
of Black political independence did not ma and income. Mondale received majority
terialize insofar as the general election is support only among Blacks (90%), Hisconcerned, Jackson’s primary challenge panics (65%), Jews (66%), those with the
“could be characterized as a ‘third party lowest income (53%), the unemployed
movement’ within the traditional two- (66%), and union households (53%).41
Given the margin of Reagan’s victory,
party system.”39 And Jackson’s demon
stration of the capacity of a Black candidate the Black vote’s impact on the outcome of
to “nationalize the Black vote” establishes the election was negligible. Jesse Jackson
the precedent that, within the Democratic and other Black leaders had anticipated
Party, the Black vote can no longer be that increased Black registration and vot
taken for granted and must be bargained ing in the election might provide the Dem
for with policy and patronage, at least dur ocratic candidate’s margin of victory in a
close contest, but Reagan also carried the
ing the nomination process.
This new reality resulting from the Jack- first time voter in 1984 by the same land
son campaign should have a major effect on slide margin of 60 to 39 percent.
One of the interesting features of the
the calculations of those Democratic
politicians (Massachusetts Senator Ed 1984 general election was the discovery by
ward Kennedy and New York Governor journalists of the phenomenon of racial
Mario Cuomo, for example) who might polarization in the electorate as evidenced
seek in 1988 and beyond to represent the by the fact that 90% of Blacks supported
liberal principles and constituencies of the the Democratic ticket while 66% of whites
supported the Republican ticket. Yet this
party.
Blacks constitute the core liberal consti degree of racial cleavage in the electorate
tuency in the Democratic Party and repre is not new, nor is it attributable to the Jacksent more than 20% of the party’s national son candidacy. Rather, as Ronald Walters
vote.40 If the party’s Fairness Commission points out, “except for the election of 1964
reshapes the delegate allocation rules so whites have not voted in a majority for a
that they correspond more closely to the Democratic presidential candidate going
one-man, one-vote principle of pro all the way back to 1944. In addition, since
portional representation, then a Black 1968, the average white vote for a Demo
candidate in a multi-candidate Democratic cratic presidential candidate has been
nomination contest should possess en 38%, but the black vote has averaged 89%
for the Democratic candidate.”42 The key
hanced leverage and bargaining power.
Thus, Jackson’s primary challenge of to understanding the source and depth of
1984 suggests that Blacks should be in a this partisan racial cleavage is the 1964
stronger position to exert influence on the presidential election.
In 1964 the Republican Party nominated
Democratic Party as it seeks to chart a
new direction in the aftermath of the third Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater as its
landslide Republican victory in the last four presidential candidate. Goldwater, a vig
orous opponent of the Civil Rights Act of
presidential elections.
1964 and the New Deal-Great Society so
The General Election
cial and economic reforms, was opposed
In his landslide defeat of Mondale (61% of by President Lyndon Johnson, the cham
the popular vote, 49 states and 525 of the pion of civil rights and the Great Society.
538 electoral voters) President Reagan Beginning with the election of 1964, there
won the support of virtually all categories has been a gradual but steady realignment
of the population in terms of gender, age, of voter support for the major parties on
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol12/iss4/5

the basis of race. (As late as 1960 Richard
Nixon, the Republican nominee, received
approximately one-third of the Black vote
in his race against President Kennedy.)
Thus, present day racial polarization in the
electorate emerged in 1964 as a result of
the Democratic Party’s implementation of
the civil rights acts of the 1960s.
Edward Carmines and James Stimson,
leading authorities on the survey data deal
ing with the racial orientation of the elec
torate put it this way:
“It was arguably the case that issues of race
were not partisan issues as recently as
1960. Advocates of racial liberalism were to
be found about equally among northern
Democrats and Republicans. . . . Neither
party found it advantageous to stake out
distinctive positions on the potentially vol
atile issue and citizens responded accord
ingly. [But] after at least a decade of simi
larity to the Democrats, Republican
identifiers moved to the racial ‘right’ in
1964... . Those who report first identifying
with the GOP in that year are strikingly
more segregationist than any other group of
identifiers. . . . The 1964 election thus ap
peared to mark a sharp and durable change
in the racial policy preferences of party sup
porters, leaving Democrats more support
ive of using the federal government to en
sure the rights of blacks. This is prelimi
nary evidence that the 1964 election was a
‘critical’ election, reorienting the attitudinal base of the two major parties. ” 43
This shift in the segregationist or racist
vote from the Democratic Party to the Re
publican Party was not simply a reaction to
the perceived liberalism of the Johnson
Administration, rather it was a rational re
sponse to the right wing Republican strat
egy of, “going hunting where the ducks
are,” to use Senator Goldwater’s phrase.
The initial assumption of conservative
Republican strategists was that most of
the “ducks” (anti-Black voters) were to be
found in the South, since Goldwater car
ried the Deep South states in 1964. How
2
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ever, the success of Alabama Governor conservative Republican candidates. This, of both the Republican and Democratic
George Wallace’s several presidential can sadly, is the real meaning of the racial Parties.49
didacies demonstrated that there was a polarization “discovered” in the 1984 elec Conclusion
significant anti-Black vote to be found out tion.
In this report we have attempted, on the
A final point on the general election, the basis of the available data, to present a
side the South. The historical significance,
therefore, of the Wallace campaigns was question of realignment: Does the 1984 preliminary assessment of the Rev. Jesse
their demonstration of the size and de election represent the displacement of the Jackson’s 1984 presidential campaign. Be
mography of the racist vote and the nature dominant New Deal-based Democratic cause of the nature of the process of politi
governing majority by a new Republican cal inquiry, our assessment is tentative and
of the strategy necessary to obtain it.44
The 1968 Nixon campaign, with its political majority? This question, since we make no claims to having presented
anti-busing, anti-Great Society and “law 1964, has been the “external question” for here the last word on the phenomenon.
and order” rhetoric, represented the be students of American national elections.47 Rather, in the months and years ahead
ginnings of the successful conservative Although it will take another year or so to there are likely to be scores of confer
Republican effort to eliminate the Wallace analyze the surveys and other data on the
ences, symposia, articles, essays and
phenomenon by drawing his constituency ideological meaning of the 1984 election, it
books that will place the Jackson campaign
of traditional Democrats into the Republi is probable that Warren Miller, principal and related Black electoral activity in a his
can electoral base. Since 1968, every Re investigator for the 1984 National Election torical and conceptual framework that will
publican presidential candidate has pur Study, will be found correct in his predic yield more definitive insight on what the
sued this strategy, sometimes subtly, tion that:
Jackson challenge might mean for Ameri
sometimes not so subtly. As a result, racial
can politics generally.
polarization in the electorate has remained
Now, we offer some final generalizations
fairly constant.
and
a hypothesis about the long-term ef
In the early 1970s, political scientist Given the margin of Rea
fects of the campaign on Afro-American
Matthew Holden, Jr., analyzed the strate gan s victory, the Black
politics and on the American party system.
gic basis of the phenomenon the following
First, Jesse Jackson’s very entry into
vote’s impact on the out
way:
the race is of great long-term symbolic sig
" ... the chances are that the Republican come of the election was
nificance, altering in an important way the
Party will [choose] to consolidate a na
symbolic understanding of the “place of
negligible.
tional majority on an anti-black basis.. . .
Blacks” in American society. This is espe
We may believe that the party would become
cially important for young people of both
the center of resistance born of a general
races because no longer are successful
ized unease about ‘things going sour, ’ that
Black symbols and images limited to Re
this generalized unease is anti-reform and
ggie [Jackson] and Michael Jackson but in
would under some circumstances be func
stead there is Jesse Jackson and the image
tionally equivalent to ‘anti-black. ’ To
of a Black man competing with compe
capitalize upon such an unease would sim
tence and style for the highest office in the
. . We will find that very little has land, not merely on the athletic field or the
ply become the most economical way for the
party to take care of its own organizational changed in the basic contours of Democra entertainment stage.
tic and Republican partisanship. There
interests. ” 45
Second, there is preliminary evidence
Edward Carmines and James Stimson in may be a one or two point gain for the Re from the University of Michigan’s National
their work make clear that it is not accu publicans, just as the Democrats gained Black Election Study that the Jackson
rate to describe one party as racist and the one or two points after the 1964 elections. campaign increased grassroots race con
other as anti-racist, but the data they sug But this ivill probably disappear by 1986, sciousness and solidarity and encouraged
gest do indicate that “racial attitudes are and we will then conclude that this election large numbers of heretofore uninvolved
not only performing the structuring func did not change us from a nation that is Blacks to become politically active.50 This
tions associated with the liberalism- fundamentally Democratic to one that is political involvement went beyond the
conservatism dimension but much of the Republican. Because the data indicate that simple act of voting to include canvassing,
meaning of this ideological dimension is the President simply won a popularity con fund raising, scheduling and other routines
also racial in nature.” In other words, to test on November 6, it is a mistake to draw of campaign organization.
many Americans, conservatism is the inferences about the policy preferences of
Related to this increased consciousness
functional equivalent of racism. Black the Nation from this. The new Congress, I and activism, the unprecedented experi
Americans intuitively understand this and believe, will reflect the fact that policy pref ence' of planning and staffing a national
it is for this reason that conservative ad erences of the American people have not presidential campaign yielded a new cadre
ministrations are widely viewed in the changed markedly. 48
of experienced political operatives pos
Black community as racist. And it is for
It is likely that for the next several elec sessing a valuable body of expertise and a
this reason, too, that a large segment of tions neither of the two major parties will nationwide network that might be acti
the white electorate (perhaps as large as command a stable and enduring national vated in future local, state and national
20%) continues to resent the 1960s civil political majority at the presidential level. campaigns. As a result of these devel
rights revolution and turns, except during Thus, rather than realignment, we are opments, scholars and journalists are al
times of serious economic dislocations, to likely to see the continued decomposition ready reporting increased Black political
Published
by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
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movement and influence in a number of
local and state jurisdictions.51
Third, the experience gained in 1984 in
campaign organization, financing, media
relations and strategy development and
day-to-day campaign management should
prove valuable in the future. The Rainbow
Coalition has become a permanent organi
zation headquartered in Washington and
Jackson has indicated that he is “keeping
his options open” for the 1988 election.
The precedent of the Jackson campaign is
also likely to encourage other Black politi
cians to seek their parties’ presidential
nominations.
Finally, the Jackson insurgency in 1984
represents the emergence of a potentially
viable independent Black power base in
side the Democratic Party and that poten
tial suggests that the Democratic Party
coalition, as it is presently constituted, is
in serious trouble. If Blacks in the party
insist (as they ought) in 1988 and there
after on their fair share of party patronage
and decision-making positions (roughly 20
percent) and on respect and due considera
tion for their predominantly liberal
ideological policy perspectives,52 it is not
likely that the current tenuous coalition of
trade unions, Blacks, Jews, liberals and
white southern conservative “bollweevils” can survive. Rather, the pros
pects may be for either the reconstitution
of the Democratic Party as a genuine pro
gressive party of the left (as the Republi
can Party, since 1964, is being
reconstituted as a party of the hard right)
with a significant Black base but without
the “boll-weevils,”53 or alternatively the
emergence of a new third party of the pro
gressive left — again with a significant
Black base 54
Recent developments in the British
party system may portend the future in the
United States: relatively pure parties of
the left and right and a moderate party of
the center.55 It is our hypothesis that the
most basic long-term implication of Jesse
Jackson’s campaign is that it may give addi
tional impetus to the long anticipated fun
damental transformation and realignment
of the American party system. The chal
lenge of a Black presidential candidacy of
1984, therefore, represents the beginning
of a new direction for Blacks in presidential
politics. But it is only a beginning.
□
Robert C. Smith and Joseph P. McCormick, II are
faculty members of the Department of Political Science
at Howard University. The first part of their report
was published in the April 1985 issue.
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